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NOTES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE

PROCESS-EQUAL PROTECTION-EXCLUSION OF FEMALES FROM REGISTRATION FOR DRAFT
NOT VIOLATIVE OF FIFTH AMENDMENT. Rostker v. Goldberg, 101

S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
On July 2, 1980, section three of the Military Selective Service
Act' was reinstated, requiring that males eighteen years of age or
older register for the draft. 2 Three days before registration was to
begin, Goldberg v. Rostker3 was decided, holding that male-only registration was an unconstitutional form of gender-based discrimination. The district court enjoined registration under the Act.
However, Justice Brennan, acting in his capacity as Circuit Justice
for the Third Circuit, granted a stay of the order pending appeal to
the United States Supreme Court.' On appeal, the Supreme Court
noted that Congress, in passing the Act, was operating under an explicit constitutional grant of authority,5 therefore its powers were
broad and sweeping.6 Since Congress had specifically considered
the constitutionality of the Act and had extensively examined the
question of registering women, the Supreme Court deferred to Con1. 50 U.S.C. § 453 (1976).
2. Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45247 (1980).
3. 509 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The proceeding was initiated during the Vietnam
era (1971). The plaintiffs originally attacked the Selective Service System on several
grounds, but only the equal protection claim survived. Rowland v. Tarr, 480 F.2d 545, 547
(3d Cir. 1973). President Ford ended draft registration in 1975 causing the case to be postponed, but when registration was renewed in 1980, it moved quickly to decision.
4. Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306 (1980).
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, provides in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power...
[11] To declare War ...
[12] To raise and support Armies...
[13] To provide and maintain a Navy;
[14] To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces;
[18] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers...
6. Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2651-52 (1981) (citing United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
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gress' judgment. The Court noted that Congress specifically linked
its consideration of registration with induction and concluded that
the purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat
troops.8 In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court held that
due process was not violated since women are excluded from combat by statute9 or by military policy and therefore are not " 'similarly situated"' to males for purposes of a draft or registration for a
draft."" l Rosiker v. Goldberg, 101 S.Ct. 2646 (1981).
Federal and state governmental powers are limited by the
United States Constitution. The Supreme Court has the ultimate
authority to interpret these limitations. 12 The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, which is applicable only to the states, contains a guarantee of equal protection.' 3 However, this guarantee
does not insure that all persons will be treated alike. States have the
power to differentiate classes for legislative purposes, but the classification must be "based upon some reasonable ground-some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted
classification-and is not a mere arbitrary selection."' 4 The fifth
amendment' 5 contains no equal protection clause to limit the federal government, but "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process."'16 The scope of equal protection under
the fifth amendment has been construed as coextensive with that
only "when there is no special naunder the fourteenth amendment
17
tional interest involved."'
The Warren Court applied a two-tier standard in equal protection cases.'I In most cases the test was whether there was a "rational
legislative basis" for laws having a different impact on persons simi7. Id. at 2653.
8. Id. at 2653, 2657.

9. 10 U.S.C. §§ 6015, 8549 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
10. "The Constitution requires that Congress treat similarly situated persons similarly,
not that it engage in gestures of superficial equality." 101 S. Ct. at 2659.
11. Id. at 2658.
12. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
14. Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165-66 (1897).

15. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
16. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
17. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
18. Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court.- A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 H.nv. L. Rv. 1, 8 (1972).
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larly situated.' 9 Alternatively, cases involving suspect classifications 20 or affecting fundamental liberties 2' required an examination
of the relation between legislative means and ends with "strict
scrutiny.22

Reed v. Reed 23 originated a middle-tier standard by which to
evaluate laws involving gender-based discrimination. 24 The Burger
Court held that administrative convenience was not a sufficiently
rational basis to uphold an Idaho statute granting preference to
male estate executors. The Court modified the "rational basis" test
by stating that "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "25
The Court in Frontiero v. Richardson26 voided gender-based
regulations involving benefits for dependents of military service
members. However, the plurality 27 went beyond Reed and found
that sex was a "suspect classification" requiring the application of
the "strict scrutiny" test. Since Frontiero, however, no plurality has
19. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). The older of the two
levels of review, the rational basis, was used for "classifications employed in economic and
general social welfare regulation." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (1978). The traditional criterion used by the Court is that a statue is valid
unless it is without a rational basis. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412
(1920). "[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed." Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
20. E.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (race).
21. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(right of indigent to free transcript).
22. Under the strict scrutiny test the government must prove that a discriminatory classification is necessary to promote a compelling government interest in order to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
23. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
24. See Gunther, supra note 18, at 33-34; Johnson, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme
Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 622 (1974); Nowak, Realigningthe Standardsof
Review Under the Equal ProtectionGuarantee-ProhibitedNeutral,andPermissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1076 (1974); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 953 (1975).
25. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
26. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). Under the challenged regulations, a male
service member could claim his wife as a dependent without proof of her dependency but a
female service member had to prove that her husband was an actual dependent before being
able to obtain increased living quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits.
27. All members of the Court, except Justice Rehnquist, agreed that there was a violation of equal protection, but four Justices refused to find sex to be a suspect classification.

270

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:267

insisted upon the strict scrutiny standard for gender-based
discrimination.2 8
Viewing gender-based discrimination after the imposition of elevated scrutiny in Reed, the Court in Kahn v. Shevin 29 indicated that
gender-based classifications in statutes which evidence a benign purpose would be upheld. In Kahn, the Court held that compensation
for discrimination in the job market was a rational basis for a statute
granting property tax exemptions for women only.30 The Court
distinguished Reed and Frondero on the basis that the statutes questioned in those cases differentiated between the sexes solely for administrative convenience, an unconstitutional justification. 3 ' The
Court again used a higher scrutiny test when it subsequently upheld
a gender-based scheme for the promotion of military officers in
Schlesinger v. Ballard.32 The preferential treatment afforded females was permissible because it reflected "the demonstrable fact
that male and female line officers. . . are not similarly situated with
respect to opportunities for professional service" since women are
excluded from combat duty. 33 However, the Court appears to have

signaled a retreat from this type of reasoning 34 in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 3 5 The Court struck down a provision of the Social Security
Act granting greater benefits to women than to men. The provision's purpose was to allow women to decline to work in order to
care for children, which, the Court said, did not attempt to compensate for the special disadvantages of women. 6
28. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
30. Id. at 355. "Florida's differing treatment of widows and widowers 'rest[s] upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.'" Id. (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
31. 416 U.S. at 355. Kahn was also distinguished as a tax statute to which the Court
grants special latitude for classification purposes. Id.
32. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). The military promotion system was challenged for allowing
female officers to remain in the service four years longer than male officers after failing to be
promoted a second time.
33. Id. at 508. "The Constitution requires that Congress treat similarly situated persons
similarly, not that it engage in gestures of superficial equality." 101 S. Ct. at 2659.
34. See Roberts, Gender-Based Draft Registration, Congressional Policy and Equal Protection. A ProposalforDeferentialMiddle-Tier Review, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 35, 48-49 (1980).
35. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
36. The Court said that:
[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield
which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme. Here, it is apparent both from the statutory scheme itself and from the
legislative history. . . that Congress' purpose in providing benefits to young widows with children was not to provide an income to women who were, because of
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Craig v. Boren 31 completed the process begun with Reed by
clearly articulating a middle-tier test for gender-based discrimination.3 8 Invalidating an Oklahoma law allowing females to purchase
3.2 beer at an earlier age than males, the Court said "To withstand
constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. '39 Although Craig was only a plurality opinion, it has since gained acceptance by a majority of the Court.'
The Court has had frequent opportunity to examine cases alleging gender-based discrimination since Craig,4 but only a few of its
decisions have added to the development of the middle-tier standard. The Court did, however, modify the Craig test in Wengler v.
DruggistsMutualInsurance Co.4 2 In voiding a provision of the Missouri workers' compensation laws automatically allowing death
benefits to widows but not to widowers, 43 the Court stated that simply describing a benign purpose is not sufficient. 44 In addition, the
Court required that the government bear the burden of proving that
a gender-neutral statute would be a less effective means of achieving
economic discrimination, unable to provide for themselves. Rather, [the statute],
linked as it is directly to responsibility for minor children, was intended to permit
women to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the care of children. Since
this purpose in no way is premised upon any special disadvantages of women, it
cannot serve to justify a gender-based distinction which diminishes the protection
afforded to women who do work.
Id. at 648 (citation omitted).
37. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (plurality opinion).
38. See Roberts, supra note 34, at 48-49.
39. 429 U.S. at 197.
40. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). Note, however, that the majority obtained support for the Craig standard by upholding provisions of the Social Security
Act which provided preferential treatment for female wage earners. The Court found that
reducing the disparity in economic conditions between men and women caused by the long
history of discrimination against women was an "important governmental objective." Id. at
317.
41. Eg., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (plurality opinion).
42. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
43. The challenged provision denied a widower benefits from his wife's work related
death unless he either was physically incapacitated or proved dependence on his wife's earnings. However, the law provided death benefits to widows without proof of dependence on
their husbands' earnings.
44. The purpose intended by the Missouri Legislature was to assist all widows with
death benefits while limiting death benefits to only those widowers in need. 446 U.S. at 151.
Accord, Roberts, supra note 34, at 51.

272

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:267

an important governmental interest under the Craig test.45
The Court's most recent examinations of the issue of sex discrimination appear to indicate differences in the application of the
middle-tier standard of review. In Parhamv. Hughes" and Caban v.
Alohamtnned,4 7 decided on the same day, the Court reached different

conclusions about an unmarried father's rights in relation to his
children."a In Kirchberg v. Feenstra49 a unanimous Court struck
down a Louisiana statute giving a husband the unilateral right to
dispose of jointly owned property without his spouse's consent.
While the majority applied the Craig test, Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist concurred in the result by finding that for the purposes of
the questioned statute the sexes were similarly situated, which also
resulted in a finding of unconstitutionality ° The Court in Michael
M v. Superior Court5 found a statutory rape law, under which only
men could be criminally liable, to be constitutionally permissible.
However, the dissent argued that the government failed to meet its
burden of proof under the middle-tier standard of review. 2
The exclusion of females from registration for the draft presents
an issue of gender-based discrimination that must be considered
concomitantly with Congress' powers under the war powers
clause. 53 Under this clause the Court has recognized a constitutionally defensible basis to differentiate between the scope of civil liberties pertaining to military service personnel and those pertaining to
45. The Court said that the burden is "[o]n those defending the discrimination to make

out the claimed justification" which can only be achieved by a "persuasive demonstration as
to what the economic consequences.

equally under the law ..

. .

might be if.

.

. men and women.

. .

were treated

" 446 U.S. at 151-52. This requirement was more clearly articu-

lated in later cases. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 490 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281, 283 (1979).

46. 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (plurality opinion).
47. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
48. The Court, in Parham, found no violation of equal protection in a statute preclud-

ing a father but not a mother from suing for the wrongful death of a child who had not been
legitimized. The Court in Caban, however, invalidated a statute allowing an unwed mother,

subject to some exceptions, to block the adoption of her child by withholding consent while
the unwed father had no such power.
49. 450 U.S. 455 (1981).

50. Id. at 463 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
51. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion).
52. "The burden is on the government to prove both the importance of its asserted

objective and the substantial relationship between the classification and that objective. ...
And the State cannot meet that burden without showing that a gender-neutral statute would

be a less effective means of achieving that goal." Id. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. Id. at 496.
53. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, text reprinted supra note 5.
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civilians. 4 When civilian activities relate to national security they
too may be restricted under Congress' broad authority. 5 One of the
56
areas in which Congress exercises such control is draft registration.
In Rostker v. Goldberg57 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said that in "judging the constitutionality of an act of Congress-'the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called
upon to perform, . . . the Court accords 'great weight to the decisions of Congress.' 59 Although the power of Congress is broad
and the Court's lack of competence in this area is marked, the Court
said that Congress was not free to disregard the Constitution when
acting in the area of military affairs and remained subject to the
limitations of the due process clause. 6° Thus, despite the deference
accorded congressional determinations in the area of military affairs, it remained for the Court to determine whether Congress' decision denies equal protection but not to substitute its "own
evaluation of6evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch." '
The Court said that it found no reason to depart from the
heightened scrutiny used to approach gender-based discrimination
in Reed, Craig, and MichaelM. 62 and proceeded to find that raising
54. Eg., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (regulations restricting circulation of
petitions on base justified by military requirements for discipline and respect for duty); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1976) (denial of right to counsel in summary court
martial proceedings justified on the basis that mechanical application of Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (providing counsel to civilians in all prosecutions that could
result in imprisonment) would interfere substantially with military procedures for punishment of the most minor offenses); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (restriction of free
speech of military personnel justified by "[t]he fundamental necessity for obedience, and the
consequent necessity for imposition of discipline .... ").
55. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upheld prohibition against partisan
speech by civilian within confines of military base).
56. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (upheld Congress' exemption
from compulsory military service for those whose religions forbid them to engage in all wars
although those whose religions forbid them to engage in only unjust wars were not exempted); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (imposition of criminal penalties for
draft card destruction upheld).
57. 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
58. Id. at 2651 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927), mod#Fed, 276 U.S.
594 (1928)).
59. Id. (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973)). The
Court found that Congress was acting under an explicit grant of constitutional authority,
had extensively evaluated the question of registering women, and had specifically examined
the question of the Act's constitutionality. Id.
60. Id. at 2653.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2654.
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and supporting armies is "an important governmental interest"
under the Craig test. 63 The Court considered registration to be "the
first step 'in a united and continuous process designed to raise an
army speedily and efficiently' "64 and accepted Congress' determination that the need would be for combat troops if a draft took place. 65
Therefore, the Court reasoned that the purpose of registration was
to prepare for a draft of combat troops, 66 and since women were not
eligible for combat,67 they "are simply not similarly situated" to
men for purposes of registration for a draft.68 The Court concluded
that "exemption of women from registration [was] not only sufficiently but closely related to Congress' purposes in authorizing registration, '69 thereby satisfying the second part of the Craig test.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented 70 objecting to the majority's failure to separate registration from conscription.7 ' They reasoned that the purpose of registration was to
create a pool of military inventory and that this could be accomplished just as effectively by registering men and women regardless
of the fact that only combat troops might be conscripted.72 Therefore, the dissenters found that the only justification for excluding
women from registration was administrative convenience, an inadequate constitutional justification.73 Additionally, they thought that
the majority paid only lip service to the Craig test while actually
avoiding it by applying a substantially different approach. 4
The holding in Rosiker appears to be congruent with the
Court's prior decisions.75 The history of the Court's deference to
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2656 (quoting Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 553 (1944)).
65. Id. at 2657.
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 2658.

69. Id. (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 2662-76. Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, also dissented. They felt
that the case should have been remanded for further findings on Congress' conclusion that
each of the services could rely on women volunteers to fill all the positions for which they
might be eligible in the event of mobilization. Id. at 2661-62.
71.

"[W~e are not asked to rule on the constitutionality of a statute governing conscrnp-

tion;" Id. at 2662 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 2667.

73. Id.
74. "[A]lthough the Court purports to apply the Craig v. Boren test, the 'similarity situated' analysis the Court employs is in fact significantly different from the Craig v. Boren
approach." Id. at 2666.
75. For an excellent analysis of the lower court's opinion and a well reasoned applica-

tion to Supreme Court precedent, see Roberts, supra note 34.
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congressional choice in military matters and the overriding national
interests exception to equal protection under the fifth amendment
might have permitted the Court to achieve the same result without
applying the middle-tier test for gender-based discrimination. 76 The
case is significant because it represents another step in the Court's
acceptance of the middle-tier standard as a consistent and reliable
method by which to evaluate gender-based discrimination.
Since the middle-tier standard was articulated it has slowly
gained acceptance by members of the Court." Justice Rehnquist
has been its strongest opponent.7 8 His majority opinion in Rosiker
indicates that his opposition to Craig is weakening and perhaps indicates a decision to embrace the standard.7 9
Justice Rehnquist specifically refused to accept the government's contention that the Craig test should not be applied to
Rostker.8 ° Justice Rehnquist could have chosen to concur in the
judgment if he were still strongly opposed to the intermediate standard of review. 8' It thus appears that Rostker indicates at least a
76. Previous decisions have held that certain rights must be interpreted differently in a
military context. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353-58 (1980). This reasoning
might easily have been used to justify a retreat from the middle-tier standard when raising
an army, an overriding national interest. This was an option offered to the Court which they
declined. 101 S. Ct. at 2654.
77. The test as articulated in Craig was embraced at that time only by Justices Brennan
and Marshall. The seven other Justices filed separate opinions although all the Justices,
except Justice Rehnquist, have since joined in opinions employing the Craig test. See, e.g.,
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (Justices White, Powell, Stevens, Blackmun, and
Chief Justice Burger); Off v. Off, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Justices Stewart and White).
78. Justice Rehnquist filed the strongest dissent in Craig, clearly stating his preference
for the rational basis test as the method for judging gender-based discrimination. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217-18 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although Chief Justice Burger has agreed with him, Justice Rehnquist has generally been the spokesman for the two.
See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 224 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
215 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). But see Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 321 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
79. From refusal to accept the Craig standard, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 224 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), to joining a plurality recognizing the validity of the Craig test, see Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1979), and then recognizing "that the traditional minimum
rationality test takes on a somewhat 'sharper focus' when gender-based classifications are
challenged," Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981) (citing Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)), it seems apparent that Justice Rehnquist has at least retreated from his original stance.
80. 101 S.Ct. at 2653-54.
81. Rostker was a six to three decision. Justice Rehnquist could easily have chosen to
ignore Craig,supra note 76, or he could have filed a concurring opinion had his brothers
chosen to adhere to Craig in their determinations.
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tentative acceptance by Justice Rehnquist of the Craigv. Boren middle-tier standard.
Although Justice Marshall said that the majority applied a test
different from that in Craig,82 his assertion is questionable. Justice
Rehnquist did, however, follow a different procedure. He applied
an initial test to determine whether the sexes were similarly situated
for purposes of the statute in question, based on the Reed rationale.83 A determination that the parties are similarly situated results
in a per se finding of unconstitutionality.8 4 If the parties are not
similarly situated then the appropriate test8 5 is applied. In Rostker,
Justice Rehnquist found the sexes not to be7 similarly situated8 6 and
then appropriately applied the Craig test.
Apart from the problem of discerning whether Justice Rehnquist has accepted the Craig v. Boren standard, there is the additional problem that Justice Rehnquist and Justices Marshall and
Brennan clearly differ on how it is to be applied. For example, Justice Rehnquist seems more easily persuaded than his brothers that
the sexes are not similarly situated 8 which has the effect of requiring a middle-tier evaluation when his brothers would find a per se
constitutional violation. 9 Also, he affords a greater degree of deference to legislative enactments, and thus is more likely to find signifi82. 101 S. Ct. at 2666 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. "Regardless of their sex, persons within any one of the enumerated classes of [the
challenged statute] are similarly situated with respect to [the objective of the statute]. By
providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause." Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971)
(citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920)).
84. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 463 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
85. For Justices Rehnquist and Stewart the appropriate test may or may not be the
Craig test. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-469 (1981) (plurality opinion); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 357 (1979) (plurality opinion). However, Justice
Rehnquist appears to find that the appropriate test in Rosiker is the Craig test. 101 S.Ct. at
2654.
86. 101 S.Ct. at 2658.
87. Id. at 2654, 2658.
88. For example, Justice Rehnquist has joined in opinions holding that past discrimination supports afinding that women are not similarly situated to men. See Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351, 353-55 (1974). To the contrary, Justices Marshall and Brennan find this reasoning leads to the enforcement of stereotyped inferiority. See id. at 357 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
89. This assumes that Justices Brennan and Marshall impliedly follow Justice Rehnquist's procedure of initially determining whether the sexes were similarly situated for all
relevant purposes of the challenged statute. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 358 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cant governmental interests. 90 Finally, Justice Rehnquist restricts
the examination of a challenged statute to the statute as drawn and
not as the statute could have been drawn to achieve the same
results.9

Rosiker makes it clear that women will not be required to register for a draft in the near future. It also illustrates that a middle-tier
level for evaluation of gender-based discrimination continues to
gain acceptance. Although Rostker may be an indication of Justice
Rehnquist's acquiescence to the middle-tier standard, there remain
differences in application of the test among the members of the
Court. Until those differences are reconciled, it is unlikely that results from the application of the middle-tier standard will be
consistent.
Neil Deininger

90. Justice Rehnquist finds great deference due state legislative enactments. "The justification for the statute offered by the State, and accepted by the Supreme Court of California, is that the legislature sought to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies. That finding,
of course, is entitled to great deference." Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470
(1981) (plurality opinion) (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1967)). In contrast, in an area in which the Court has accorded Congress greater deference than perhaps
any other area (military affairs), Justice Marshall claims that "deference to congressional
judgments cannot be allowed to shade into an abdication of this Court's ultimate responsibility to decide constitutional questions." 101 S. Ct. at 2663 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. In Michael M., Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, said, "The relevant inquiry, however, is not whether the statute is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but
whether the line chosen by the California Legislature is within constitutional limitations."
450 U.S. at 473 (1981) (plurality opinion) (citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 n.10
(1974)). In Rostker, referring to this language, Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[W]e rejected a
similar argument because of action by the California Legislature considering and rejecting
proposals to make a statute challenged on discrimination grounds gender-neutral. The
cause for rejecting the argument is considerably stronger here." 101 S. Ct. at 2656. Justices
Marshall and Brennan argue that the requirement that a statute be substantially related to
the achievement of its objectives, the second leg of the Craig test, cannot be met unless the
government proves a gender-neutral statute to be a less effective means of achieving that
goal. See, e.g., 101 S. Ct. at 2667 n.l 1 (Marshall, J., dissenting); supra note 52.

